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ABSTRACT: Contemporary American policing practices are marked by increasingly top-down, racialized,
militarized, and pseudo-scientiﬁc features. Social scientists have played a central role in creating this
political situation: social-scientiﬁc advocates of “law and order,” far from providing a value-neutral
description of social reality, appear instead to have contributed to the creation of a peculiarly modern
form of power.
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People are trapped in history, and history is trapped in them.
—James Baldwin

Contemporary policing has attracted little attention from interpretive philosophers even as neighboring
ﬁelds have seen an explosion of interest in the topic.
Historians have unmasked the discriminatory effects of contemporary policing in America, and
the unequal enforcement of crime along racial lines—leading to the mass incarceration of mostly black
and Latino men (Alexander 2010; Hinton 2016; Nunn 2002). Ethnographers and sociologists have
brought attention to the increasing militarization of American police tactics and culture, showing that
the line between police and military has been blurred in key respects (Balko 2014; Kraska 2001; Kraska
and Kappeler 1997). Legal scholars have raised ethical concerns about the role of data analysis and
computer algorithms in the shaping of police work (Ferguson 2017). These insights are important, and I
will return to them in greater detail below. But certain key philosophical and epistemological features of
this form of policing have gone unnoticed. By drawing creatively on Martin Heidegger’s critique of
technology and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of meaning making, hermeneutics can shed fresh light on
policing in America today.
Hermeneutics, or interpretive theory, is the view that human action is constituted by historical
and cultural meanings and therefore is not ultimately susceptible to scientiﬁc prediction (Bevir and
Blakely2018). This premise generates a novel analysis of the relationship between knowledge and
policing in contemporary American society. Speciﬁcally, interpretive theory reveals the way an
epistemological discourse has helped to construct a top-down, militarized, and discriminatory form of
law enforcement. In other words, there is a particular epistemic order underlying the political one. Thus,
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assumptions about human action and the inescapability of interpretation can contribute to an analysis
of the spread of technocracy in political life (Gadamer 1975).
My inquiry will have two distinct parts. The ﬁrst offers a brief historical sketch of the “law and
order paradigm” of policing and will contend that what claims to be an empirical, descriptive science is
in fact a tendentious form of meaning making that helped build a political world. The key concept for
understanding this phenomenon is the double hermeneutic effect. The second part of the paper draws
on interpretive theory to argue that pivotal scholars in the law-and-order movement failed to meet the
standards of value neutrality and of scientiﬁc explanation. Speciﬁcally, Heidegger’s critique of
technology introduces a distinction between the kind of causality appropriate to the explanation of
human behavior and the kind that is appropriate to the brute objects of the physical sciences. Law-andorder scholars have failed to employ the proper concept of causality, and thus have used inappropriately
mechanistic and ahistorical notions of human agency. Moreover, Heidegger’s conception of the
technological gaze as an ethical way of being in the world suggests that the law-and-order paradigm is
not a legitimate form of scientiﬁc authority but a kind of ideological or ethical stance best understood as
a form of technocracy. Thus, the rise of this technopolicing paradigm, which claims to rest on science, is,
from the interpretive perspective, a problematic form of authority and social control.

I.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF LAW-AND-ORDER TECHNO-POLICING

There is widespread consensus among scholars across a variety of disciplines that criminal justice policy
in America underwent a massive transformation beginning in the 1960s. Although details are contested,
the broad outlines of the narrative converge. What historians have unearthed is a clear turn away from
the New Deal approach, which emphasized rehabilitation and poverty alleviation, toward an ordermaintenance approach legislating the incapacitation and swift punishment of an allegedly criminal
underclass (Flamm2005; French 2018; Hinton 2016). Thus where New Deal social democrats focused on
federal welfare programs (albeit unevenly administered across racial groups) to prevent crime, the
order-maintenance approach pursued policing and promoted the metaphor of a war to save civil society
(Herbert 2006).
A key feature of what came to be known as the law-and-order movement was anxiety about a
diverse bundle of issues brought together under the umbrella category of “disorder.” Disorder was a
catchword for disparate social phenomena, including rising crime, civil rights activism, and antiwar
protests. A remarkable effect of the discourse of disorder was to blur the lines between crime and the
rising political dissent of the 1960s (Flamm 2005). For example, Martin Luther King was publicly accused
by order-maintenance advocates of weakening respect for the law through his practice of civil
disobedience. Ironically, King’s peaceful movement was blamed for the rise of violent crime and rioting
(ibid., 3-4, 64). Historians have also established that the emergent law-and- order discourse drew an
“explosive equation” between “race and crime” that has remained central to the American discourse on
policing ever since (ibid., 14). The policing of disorder, applied unevenly across racial groups, led to the
mass incarceration of black and Latino men in particular and their exclusion from civic life (Alexander
2010; Goffman 2014; Rios 2011).
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The basic outlines of the narrative sketched so far are widely known. However, what is far less
frequently understood is that a complex epistemological order sits beneath this new political order.
Here, interpretive theory has an important contribution to make to the discussion. First, hermeneutics
shows that the modern social sciences do not exist in laboratory-like isolation. Instead, they penetrate
and help to build the political lifeworld (Gadamer 1975, 316). This is made clear by what interpretive
philosophers call the “double hermeneutic” (Giddens 2013, 374).
Interpretive theory insists that human beings are cultural animals—that is, they always embody
and signal meaning through their actions, practices, and social spaces. As Clifford Geertz (1973, 5)
famously put, “man is an animal suspended in webs of signiﬁcance he himself has spun.” This implies
that human action and social life can in various and surprising ways incorporate the very social scientiﬁc
theories that are used to describe it. That is, meanings of social-science developed by expert scholars
and theorists can enter, shape, and radically change the cultural sphere. Social scientists try to decode
and interpret a social space that already embodies interpretations—including those created by social
scientists. The double effect is that the meanings of social scientists interpreting the actions of social and
political agents can constitute the meanings and thus the actions of those agents.
This effect is dramatically on display in the case of “law and order,” which began as a vision of
crime ﬁrst articulated by criminologists, sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists that, in turn,
helped constitute and usher in a “revolution in American policing” (Nifong 1971, 1). Because this vision
was couched as science, it had special power.
Of course, claims to a science of crime and law enforcement are far from new. The nineteenthcentury basis of modern criminology was the premise that scientiﬁc rationality could guide the state in
crime control. A key founder of modern criminology, Cesare Lombroso (2003, 1), argued that some
people are biologically criminal and can be identiﬁed via anatomical features as “dangerous persons.” In
America, such pseudo-scientiﬁc theories helped build the post-bellum world of Jim Crow, with its
obsessive focus on the so-called “Negro Problem” (Muhammad 2010; Hinton, 2016).
But a different epistemological discourse justiﬁed the twentieth- century shift to ordermaintenance policing. The theorists of law and order rejected crude Lombrosian criminology and drew
on the new paradigms of behavioral genetics, behaviorist psychology, and economic rational-choice
theory to build what they viewed as a science of law enforcement. They also pitted themselves against a
very different political antagonist than the nineteenth-century “Negro Problem” theorists who rejected
Reconstruction and integration. Law-and-order scholars had as their main concern the New Deal belief
that social inclusion, equality, and poverty alleviation were essential to addressing crime. Instead of
welfare programs, these scholars believed that law enforcement and punishment ought to be placed at
the very center of criminal justice policy.
The most prominent intellectuals behind this shift were James Q. Wilson, George Kelling,
Richard Herrnstein, and Charles Murray. This group self-stylized as hard-nosed empiricists, willing to go
wherever the data led—even if this meant discovering “innate differences” between “ethnic
compositions” or establishing that “some people are wicked” because they have a “criminal
personality” (Murray 2013, xvi, xiii, xvi, xv). Such ﬁndings would amount to a direct repudiation of the
New Deal’s emphasis on education and rehabilitation, as they suggested that no amount of poverty
alleviation or educational intervention could adequately deal with crime. Instead, the best remedy was
order maintenance—speciﬁcally, policing and imprisonment. Mass imprisonment was there- fore the
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practical conclusion of a set of epistemological claims. For this new generation of criminologists, the fact
that “imprisonment numbers … started to soar” in the 1980s marked scientiﬁc progress away from the
misguided indulgence of criminal personalities (xvii).
As I now hope to show, the epistemological authority of claims to science inﬁltrated and
constructed the political lifeworld. I will focus on three major social-scientiﬁc themes from this body of
work that helped generate the ﬂesh-and-blood world of law and order policing.
The Determinism of “Law and Order”
The ﬁrst theme is Wilson and Herrnstein’s view that human psychology is structured by utilitycalculating features that interact with inputs from genetics, the environment, and socialization. In their
widely read work, Crime and Human Nature, Wilson and Herrnstein (1985, 44) argued that crime is the
result of an individual calculation about “the ratio of the net rewards of crime to the net rewards of noncrime.” According to this view, individuals will calculate differently dependent on a host of factors,
including a personal history of past reinforcing consequences. The “net value” or “sum of all the
reinforcements positive and negative” of past behaviors determines whether or not a crime was
committed (ibid.,50). Speciﬁcally, “the larger the ratio of the rewards (material and nonmaterial) of noncrime to the rewards (material and nonmaterial) of crime, the weaker the tendency to commit crimes”
(ibid., 61). Thus, it is “a mistake . . . to argue about whether a given offense is or is not ‘rational,’”as all
criminal psychology is a form of rational calculation and preference maximization (ibid., 56). Criminal
psychology differs from ordinary psychology only in the inputs, but the structure of reasoning is
fundamentally the same. Criminals have the psychology of Homo economicus.
With these premises in place, Wilson and Herrnstein reasoned that the role of government is to
change the calculus of crime. Crime must in no sense “pay,” so the chief focus of criminal justice should
be deterrence through policing and punishment. Where social democrats often held that policing could
not change the underlying social and economic sources of crime, Wilson and Herrnstein turned this
assumption on its head. Now it was social inclusion, education, and economic policy that were inert.
Policing and punishment, by contrast, were among the few levers government possessed that could
effectively change the crime rate. The structure of rational agency put forth by Wilson and Herrnstein
owed a large intellectual debt to the rising neoliberalized subject propounded by economics (see Bevir
2010 and Harvey 2005)). Law-and- order epistemology therefore participated in a much larger shift
away from notions of public and shared goods, in favor of a vision of society as highly individualistic and
calculative. Criminals are, in this view, market actors haggling, if only in their own heads, over the price
of this or that violent crime. The implication for criminal-justice policy was that government needed to
design the right kind of crime market (so to speak), in which the costs of purchasing a given infraction
becomes prohibitively high.
One of the most dramatic forms of meaning making and world build- ing to stem from this
theory was Wilson and Kelling’s extremely popular “broken windows” thesis. Published in 1982 as an
article in The Atlantic, Wilson and Kelling’s largely speculative argument became perhaps the most
inﬂuential crime-control theory of the late twentieth century.
The central claim of broken-windows policing was that visible signs of social disorder (e.g.,
vandalism, panhandling, loitering) raise the causal probability of violent crimes (e.g., assault, theft,
murder). “Disorder and crime are . . . inextricably linked,” Wilson and Kelling (2013a, 65) wrote, because
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“one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs
nothing.” In other words, would-be criminals are continually running calculations of the costs of crime in
a given market. The result of letting the price of small misdeeds fall is a “criminal invasion” (67). If the
invasion is to be repelled, every infraction of the law—no matter how small—must be made to carry a
heavy price for the criminal.
The remedy was a form of policing that requires ofﬁcers to take “informal” and perhaps even
“extralegal steps” to change the market calculus of committing a crime (Wilson and Kelling 2013a, 65).
Wilson and Kelling suggested that designing the right crime market might mean signaling that “rights”
were something “enjoyed by decent folk” and not always applicable to “young toughs” (ibid., 68-69).
This line of thought might be linked to the expanded exercise of police authority beyond traditional legal
norms (e.g., stop-and-frisk policing). But the main thrust of Wilson and Kelling’s argument was that
changing the crime calculus required a zero-tolerance approach to petty offenses. Previously tolerated
infractions such as loitering, panhandling, and turnstile jumping would now be swiftly punished. In this
way, a social-scientiﬁc theory encouraged cracking down on petty crime, because unpunished petty
crime was now causally linked to such serious misdeeds as assault and murder. In other words, small
infractions no longer appeared so small: petty offenses alter the crime market, leading otherwise lawabiding citizens to calculate that crime pays and encouraging higher rates of grave wrongdoing. The
result was the order-maintenance policing championed by Mayor Rudy Giuliani in New York City, which
later spread across the country.
Legal scholars such as Bernard Harcourt (2001) have argued that “broken windows” did not in
fact lower the crime rate in cities like New York. But more important for the present argument is that
broken-windows policing had racially and economically discriminatory effects. This had in large part to
do with the operationalization of the concept of “disorder.” Minor illegalities associated with poverty
(such as turnstile jumping and public drinking) became criminalized as disorderly, while violations of the
law by a mostly white upper class (including tax evasion and certain kinds of drug use) were not seen as
disorderly. Thus, empirically speaking, broken windows engendered the surveillance and policing of an
“unattached, young, most often racialized other” (Harcourt 2002). In short, what began as a descriptive
social science of crime generated its own very real world of racial bias and power (Rios2011). An
epistemological order became partly constitutive of a political one.
The Genetic Ontology of “Law and Order”
A second line of thought pioneered by criminologists such as Wilson held that some individuals have
deeply ingrained criminal tendencies. Wilson and Herrnstein argued that not everyone calculates the
costs and beneﬁts of committing crimes using the same biological, environmental, and social inputs. On
this view, some people are from the outset much more given to criminality—even though each input is
not determinative of criminality but only heightens the probabilities. For example, they claimed that
there is “a clear and consistent link between criminality and low intelligence” because “low intelligence
will favor impulsive crimes with immediate rewards” (Wilson and Herrnstein 1985, 148, 167). Criminals
are also more likely to exhibit “assertive, unafraid, aggressive, unconventional, extroverted and poorly
socialized” personalities (ibid., 177). Such factors are said to run “in families” because they have “both
genetic and environmental origins” (ibid., 209). Thus, while Wilson and Herrnstein frequently stressed
that their position was not a “theory of predestination” or an assertion of an inborn criminal personality,
the truth is more complicated (ibid., 509). They naturalized criminality, but by means of an actuarial
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logic that rejected the Lombrosian school’s strict determinism. What emerged was portrayed as
predictive knowledge about “high- rate, repeat criminals” (Wilson and Kelling 2013b, 142). Indeed, the
probabilities may become so overwhelmingly high as to create a class of people who are in all likelihood
headed for criminality. As Wilson and Herrnstein (1985, 374) put it: “a given individual . . . may be so
predisposed to crime that no feasible change in institutionally controlled re-enforcers . . . may make any
difference.”
This conclusion is clearly a rebuke to the assumption that government intervention to combat
poverty would lower crime rates. But it also points to the limits of deterrent strategies such as those
enacted by broken- windows policing. Thus, a distinct line of practice is justiﬁed by the law-and-order
paradigm: not just order-maintaining deterrence but the aggressive incapacitation (normally through
incarceration) of certain select repeat offenders. In wider discourse this epistemological order underlies
the popular, racially coded nomenclature of the so-called “superpredator”—an individual so deeply
criminal and pathological that the only reasonable response is mass incarceration, repeat-offender laws,
and mandatory-minimum sentencing (DiIulio 1996). The main goal of criminal justice, when confronting
such individuals, is “incarcerating serious and repeat criminal offenders for lengthy sentences”
(Harcourt 2003, 106. Once again, social-scientiﬁc discourse helps structure and create a regime of
prosecution, sentencing, and punishment (Feeley and Simon 1992). Indeed, followed to its logical
conclusion, this form of knowledge might even imply punishing criminals for crimes they have not yet
committed. Wilson and Kelling (2013b, 138) note that while the traditional legal model focuses on
responsibility for a past action, probabilistic prediction is instead concerned with future prospects of
crime premised on access to a predictive science of human behavior.
But this social-scientiﬁc discourse also generates hermeneutic double effects on policing
practices. The notion that there are (in fact) “superpredators” has been one factor in the spread of a
culture of militarism in the United States police force. The point here is not to examine the problematic
epistemological claim to knowledge of a “superpredator,” but to once again note the link between social
science and police authority. A series of ethnographies pioneered by Peter Kraska (2001a) and
popularized by Radley Balko (2014) have brought attention to a “neo-praetorian” police culture in which
a supposedly deteriorating society is salvaged by the order, structure, language, culture, and high-tech
methods of the military. In this culture, the distinction between policing civilians and con- ducting
militarized combat is blurred. Kraska notes in particular the higher use of special weapons and tactics
units in the policing of what are considered high-risk zones. America’s ghettos are increasingly
framed in terms of a “counterinsurgency, low intensity conﬂict model” that seeks to eradicate the “gang
problem” through the deployment of para-militarized police units (Kraska 2001a, 23-24). Once again,
the epistemic order generates a political one. What initially appears to be simply a descriptive theory is
involved in meaning making and world creation. The very aesthetics of the militarized police culture—
the “futuristic style,” “a cold, fearless, mechanistic look” of “Kevlar helmets,” “wraparound sunglasses,” and the robotized trappings of a “techno-warrior image”—are expressive embodiments of a
particular epistemological outlook (Kraska 2001b, 144-5). What this police aesthetic expresses is the
vision of a society of scientiﬁcally legitimated use of authority and even violent force.
Racial Consequences of “Law and Order”
In a third and ﬁnal line of thought within this epistemological order, the argument becomes explicitly
racial. Already in their inﬂuential 1985 tract, Wilson and Herrnstein insinuated a reductive account of
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race and other alleged biological inputs as criminal tendencies. Indeed, they devoted nearly an entire
chapter, on “Race and Crime,” to black males as a potentially dangerous class. Through the course of
this chapter (which only ﬂeetingly considers other races), the authors advance claims about supposedly
lower average intelligence, impulsive temperament, broken family life, a problematic history, and a
deviant subculture (Wilson and Herrnstein 1985, 459-86). Black males were even said to more
frequently exhibit the “heavy-boned muscularity” and “mesomorphic” physique associated with law
breaking (ibid., 469). Although the authors were careful to present their ﬁndings as a probabilistic
hypothesis subject to further empirical scrutiny, the overall message was unmistakable: statistically,
blacks are, due to a conglomeration of biological, social, and psychological features, more prone to
criminality. Thus, each of the major “theories” linking blacks to crime was declared by law-and-order
scholars to be “probably true” and “partially correct” (ibid., 485).
A decade later, Herrnstein and his new coauthor Charles Murray would make this racial thinking
explicit in The Bell Curve, where they claimed that behavioral genetics revealed the American class
structure and racial inequality to be, for the most part, biologically determined. This argument was
widely criticized as pseudoscience by biological geneticists and other psychologists (Panofsky 2014, 1, 5,
78, 196). However, where this pseudoscientiﬁc discourse succeeded was as part of the wider discursive
shift towards the construction of “law and order.”
Sociologist Aaron Panofsky (2014, 193) has argued that these theories were disseminated in
wider American culture as part of a discourse of “astrological genetics.” Where, in a bygone age,
individuals were born under the sign Capricorn or Libra, they were now born under the sign of a
particular race, “white,” “Latino,” “Asian,” “Jewish,” or “black.” From these supposed racial signs, a
broader popular practice of inferring social destinies ensued. Stop-and-frisk and racial proﬁling were
partly constituted by this reading of signs, justiﬁed epistemologically by a claim to science. Racial bodies
were then read, so to speak, as signaling a probabilistic tendency toward criminality.
Consider in this light the recent spread of “big data policing.” With the advent of computers,
police departments can increasingly make use of large data sets and algorithmic analytics that reveal
correlations between crime and such variables as time and geography. This expanded on the older
COMPSTAT (or computer statistics) organization of police departments developed in New York City in
the 1990s (Toch and Grant 2005 258-59). More recently, anthropologist P. J. Brantingham (2009 and
2010) and his coauthors have become prominent advocates of place-based predictive policing
technology. Using mathematical models, they claim the ability to predict where future outbreaks of
crime are likely to occur due to formally identiﬁed environmental conditions. As Brantingham and his
coauthors put it, “serious crimes … are strongly patterned in time and space, forming crime ‘hot spots’”
that allow for predictive policing tactics (Brantingham et al.2010, 3961).
What such modeling neglects is the existing world of meaning in which the algorithms are set
into motion. Once social science has been embodied as a set of law-and-order practices (brokenwindows policing, carceral incapacitation, and racial proﬁling), none of the inputs into the algorithms are
neutral. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson has empirically established that big-data policing is saturated with
racial and class biases. The initial data inputs for crime are built on existing policing practices. Hot- spot
data science therefore becomes a “self-fulﬁlling prediction” that launders the original bias built into the
numbers and recodes the entire practice around a purportedly value-neutral science of statistics
(Ferguson 2017,
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74). The brute, empirical data are not neutral. A particular interpretation of reality inaugurated the
reality that big data measure. Social-scientiﬁc “facts” in this domain are the fabrications of a particular
ideology. Thus, hermeneutics reveals that the social science underlying the law and order movement
penetrates the lifeworld.
Law-and-order techno-policing is undoubtedly part of a wider shift in government that Jonathan
Simon (2007, 4) has dubbed “governing through crime” in America. What an interpretive approach lays
bare is the problematic relationship between theory and embodiment. What appears to be descriptive
science is in fact part of a much wider, tendentious form of political and ideological world making.
II.

TECHNOCRACY, VALUE NEUTRALITY, AND EXPLANATION

Scholars such as Herrnstein and Wilson (1985, 514) frequently insist that their ﬁndings are scientiﬁc and
value-neutral, giving no “comfort to . . . any ideology.” But an interpretive approach to social science
signiﬁcantly problematizes this classic Weberian dispensation. Speciﬁcally, Heidegger’s critique of
technology provides social scientists with conceptual resources for grappling with issues of both
accuracy and ethics raised by “law and order.” I do not wish to litigate whether or not law-and-order
scholars have successfully established that their tactics empirically diminish crime. My point, rather, is
philosophical.
Hermeneutics draws attention to the way in which law-and-order scholars have failed to offer
an appropriate explanation of human action. Law-and-order theories employ the wrong philosophical
conception of causality—one appropriate to the physical but not the human sciences. Ethically, my point
is not the impropriety of treating human beings like brute objects for scientiﬁc manipulation (though I
do ﬁnd this deeply ethically objectionable). Rather, my argument is that the construction of this kind of
authority is itself an ideological way of being in the world; it is not simply the ofﬁcially scientiﬁc
approach to society. Indeed, the claim that law-and-order scholarship is hard-nosed empirical science is
itself an attempt to construct technocratic ideological authority.
The Problem of Causation
Heidegger (1977) famously proposed that the widespread view of technology as a value-neutral
instrument—a means for achieving an end—is far from the whole truth. One problem, according to
Heidegger, is that this view does not understand the mode of relating to the world that makes
technology possible in the ﬁrst place. Technology is often conceived as an instrument that can be used
by different people for different ends, but Heidegger notes that this misses the way that modern
technology is grounded in a particular way of looking at reality. This way of looking then generates
various technological artifacts typical of modernity (e.g., hydroelectric dams and airplanes). From within
the technological gaze, reality appears as a ﬁeld of objects whose energies can be scientiﬁcally
controlled and released. In other words, for Heidegger the techno- logical outlook on reality begins as a
general way of being; only later is it formalized into epistemology.
Although Heidegger believed that this way of looking at reality extended far back into the
history of the West, he also thought it had achieved a particularly decisive articulation in the wake of the
natural- science revolution, which emphasized only one kind of causality—the “causa efﬁciens” or
impersonal mechanistic causality—to the exclusion of all other forms of causality (ibid., 7, 23). This
excluded the notion of the causa ﬁnalis, or causality that is guided by human purposes and goals that
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cannot be ﬁxed by antecedent mechanistic conditions. Heidegger noted that modern technology is not
primarily instrumental or neutral because it reduces non-mechanistic features (like human agency) to
impersonal, machine-like causes. The human lifeworld (along with nature) is treated increasingly like a
mechanics.
One lesson social scientists might draw from Heidegger’s line of thought is that there is an
important philosophical distinction between the form of causal explanation appropriate to the physical
sciences and that which should be employed when explaining human behavior. Heidegger’s critique of
the mechanistic causal bias of the technological mode of thinking can thus generate a conceptual
critique of America’s technopolicing practices. Consider, for example, the way Wilson’s brokenwindows theory assumes that human reasoning is mechanistically structured and triggered by certain
surrounding conditions. Even a “law- abiding” person is triggered in mechanistic and predictable ways
when an environmental cue or “signal that ‘no one cares’” enters his or her ﬁeld of vision (Wilson and
Kelling 2013a, 66). One might think, in contrast, that the beliefs someone holds are important to the
meaning one ascribes to “disorder” (or even to whether one perceives a broken window, a panhandler,
or vandalism as disordered at all). For example, depending on the beliefs a given person holds, a
panhandler might evoke pity or frustration with societal indifference instead of inspiring criminality.
Similarly, grafﬁti might be viewed as a form of urban art or political resistance instead of an invitation to
crime. Tommie Shelby (2016) and Koshka Duff (2017) have suggested that street crime in American
ghettos is sometimes better conceptualized as a form of political resistance, an expression of noconﬁdence in the prevailing political order.
Thus, the invocation of impersonal causal mechanisms by law-and- order scholars is predicated
on a fundamental conceptual error. The law-and-order scholars are trying to explain human behavior
with the causal apparatus appropriate to brute physical objects. This mechanistic conception of causality
is what generates the ahistorical, transcendental features of the theory: a human agent who reasons
according to ahistorical structures, and the reiﬁcation of meanings as triggers in the social environment.
What is effaced are the actual people under scrutiny—that is, the actual cultural meanings shaping and
guiding their behaviors as ﬁnal causes.
This issue of scientiﬁc explanation requires a little more clariﬁcation. Interpretive theory holds
that beliefs and purposes, which Heidegger associated with ﬁnal causes, are central to explaining human
behavior. By contrast, in Wilson’s theory, although individuals are sometimes characterized as
rational calculators, the mechanics of human thought are treated as scientiﬁcally ﬁxed by inputs or
triggers. This is probably due to the openly avowed inﬂuence of behaviorist psychology on Wilson’s
thinking; according to behaviorism, human agency is determined by environmental stimuli that trigger
predictable actions. Efﬁcient or mechanistic causality is presented as overriding whatever mediating
beliefs an individual might hold that could motivate action in another direction. Indeed, Wilson and
Herrnstein (1985, 505) frankly admit that their entire theoretical framework assumes “that much, if not
all, criminal behavior can be traced to antecedent conditions.”
There is undoubtedly a logical tension between the rational-choice aspects of Wilson and
Herrnstein’s theory and the behaviorist, environmental approach that eliminates the possibility of
choice. But my concern is not to explore this tension but rather to note that interpretive philosophy
usually holds that human action is never ﬁxed or determined by an efﬁcient cause. This is what
distinguishes physical movements from actions: the former are exhaustively explicable in terms of
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antecedent, impersonal causa efﬁciens while the latter are explicable only when a social scientist
properly identiﬁes the beliefs and meanings that constitute a given action. Thus, such phenomena as
“disorder” are not brute antecedent causal triggers with ready-made meanings that can be stipulated by
the social scientist. Rather, they have a semantic content that is only intelligible when situated within a
cultural context that must be ethnographically explored if it is to be understood. In other words, the
explanation of human behavior is ﬁrst and foremost the interpretation of the meanings of human
actions (Bevir and Blakely 2018). This is what law-and-order scholars neglect in their employment of a
technocratic conception of causality.
The Making of Meanings
Hans-Georg Gadamer is widely credited with clarifying the thesis that human beings are meaning
makers who inherit and live within thick traditions of historical meanings. Human belief does not have a
universal structure or content; meanings are historically formed by rival signiﬁcations (Gadamer 2004,
265-85). Gadamer’s historicizing of the human subject brings attention to the fact that the concept of
“disorder” is not a transcendental, scientiﬁc descriptor but is ﬁlled in by rival meanings that are
contingent on rival traditions. From this perspective, the notion that a sign or cue in the environment
(“disorder”) heightens the probability of triggering a hidden disposition (“criminality”) is the product of
deep philosophical confusion. The human agent is being treated as a complex of causa efﬁciens, which
makes the historical meanings informing and shaping action disappear from view. If human action is
guided by a causa ﬁnalis that is comprised of historically contingent beliefs, then the mechanistic
predictive project of the natural sciences is misguided. The plan to found a science of human actions on
causa efﬁciens is thus pseudoscientiﬁc.
This line of thought also suggests that advocates of law-and-order epistemology cannot offer a
defense of the theory of broken windows on interpretive grounds. The fact that law breaking of certain
kinds is culturally speciﬁc to a time and place is incompatible with the theories of causality (as efﬁcient)
and of agency (as ahistorical and transcendental) built into the theory. It is true that a future advocate of
law-and-order criminology might yet offer a thicker, cultural account of crime in twentieth- century
America, and from the interpretive philosophical perspective, this would mark an improvement.
However, any such future theory would be radically different in conceptual content, abandoning the
claims of rational choice, ahistorical behavioral triggers, or a criminal personality structure in favor of
the cultural meanings and self-understandings of the actual agents being analyzed. It is difﬁcult to say
what parts of law- and-order theory, if any, would survive this radical philosophical reconceptualization.
The explanatory problems with law-and-order criminology imply that there is a philosophical
tension between the epistemological structure and the political one. “Law and order” is unable to
legitimate itself by making an appeal to scientiﬁc theory. Without theoretical support, the practices no
longer have the inevitability of science. Instead, from an interpretive perspective, they are further
traditions of meaning making. “Law and order” is thus only one historical way of creating a world of
criminal justice and not a particularly scientiﬁc or rational way to do so. Interpretive social science thus
robs law and order epistemology of both its scientiﬁc authority and its aura of universality–the notion
that science has proven that deterring criminals requires X. Rather than an expert scientiﬁc vocabulary
about order and policing, there are only rival traditions of crime control.
In short, law-and-order scholars’ claims to scientiﬁc authority (via efﬁcient causality) are rhetorical and
not scientiﬁc. What calls itself “science” is in fact ideology. Technocracy, we might say, is a form of
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politics that studies culturally muted objects with the aim of manipulating them so as to engineer
certain outcomes. The technocratic approach of law-and- order scholars such as Wilson, Herrnstein, and
Murray is not value neutral but implies a particular ethical and ideological form of being in the world.
Technocratic Policing
Technocrats view social reality (and physical reality more generally) as what Heidegger (1977, 17)
famously dubbed “standing-reserves” or resources. Reality under the technocratic gaze is reduced to a
set of resources that bundle certain energies. Physics is the model, as it offers a science of the exact
measurement of the world as comprised by various energies. Nature becomes a grid of objects whose
energies must be challenged in a struggle for domination. As Heidegger puts it, “modern technology is a
challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy” (ibid., 14). The
unreasonableness stems from attempting to order something that might not ultimately be able to yield
the full, intended result, as that would presume “the ordering of the orderable” (ibid., 17). In the case of
the human sciences, the problem is one of demanding control over something that “man does not have
[ultimate] control over”—i.e., other human beings (ibid., 18). The technological gaze sees people as so
many resources, so many bundles of energy, to be instrumentalized and controlled via knowledge of the
causa efﬁciens. According to interpretive theory, this way of looking at other human beings is at the very
heart of modern technocracy as a form of rule via scientiﬁc control.
I have treated the issue of explanation and ideology as distinct. In reality, however, they are
intertwined by what Heidegger saw as the technological gaze or way of being in the world. This
technological gaze is detectable in the law-and-order theories and attendant police practices examined
above. Murray’s, Wilson’s, Kelling’s, and Herrnstein’s theories are all pervaded by a worry about how to
engineer and control hidden criminal energies concealed within individuals. These criminal energies are
made visible for technocratic management under certain signs: demo- graphic (“youth,” “black,” “male,”
“Latino,” “unemployed”); tempera- mental (“impulsive,” “assertive,” “unconventional”); physical
(“heavy- boned”; “muscular”); and psychological (“below average intelligence”; “poorly socialized”).
Each of these categories is part of an actuarial, probabilistic account of criminal energies. In other words,
the empirical signs are correlated with mechanistic, causal properties. These properties can join with
others to generate a causal mechanism that leads to a criminal act. And although no one is born a
criminal, “some individuals are more likely to become criminals than others” due to scientiﬁcally
calculable energies (Wilson and Herrnstein1985, 79). The supposed criminal energies of young, black
men are a particular source of anxiety for law- and-order scholars. This has helped generate a palpable
tension in American society over how to (scientiﬁcally) control and redirect the energies of racial
minorities.
The law-and-order movement is buttressed by a technocratic epistemology whose conceptual logic
shapes its theory and practice. In Heidegger’s language, everything is placed under the “ordering
attitude” of “modern physics” and the view that all forces are “calculable” (Heidegger 1977,21). The
theories of law and order are pervaded by an anti-humanistic, mechanical, technocratic worldview. At
the same time, law-and-order dis- course narrows the range of debate on “scientiﬁc” and “rational”
crime policy. Science has supposedly decided beforehand on what must be the response to crime. If
majorities or local communities dissent from the ﬁndings of science, then, their attitudes are de facto
irrational and unscientiﬁc.
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But the question of what ought to be the meaning of order, crime, and policing in a given
neighborhood or community is one that cannot be answered by an ahistorical science of society. One
community might follow Bogotá, Colombia in decriminalizing “disorderly” grafﬁti art (which inspired a
world-famous urban art scene). Another might, by contrast, ﬁnd the meanings of these practices to be
undesirable or otherwise problematic. Indeed, interpretive social science remains open to the possibility
of entirely new cultural constellations, in which the current “hard facts” of crime and criminality have
been superseded by new worlds.

NOTE
. A critical case has already been made by Harcourt 2001.
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